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23. Now whether all this is by means of images or not, who can rightly affirm?
For I name a stone, I name the sun, and those things themselves are not present
to my senses, but their images are present in my memory. I name some pain of
the body, yet it is not present when there is no pain; yet if there were not
some such image of it in my memory, I could not even speak of it, nor should
I be able to distinguish it from pleasure. I name bodily health when I am sound
in body, and the thing itself is indeed present in me. At the same time, unless
there were some image of it in my memory, I could not possibly call to mind
what the sound of this name signified. Nor would sick people know what was meant
when health was named, unless the same image were preserved by the power of
memory, even though the thing itself is absent from the body. I can name the
numbers we use in counting, and it is not their images but themselves that are
in my memory. I name the image of the sun, and this too is in my memory. For
I do not recall the image of that image, but that image itself, for the image
itself is present when I remember it. I name memory and I know what I name.
But where do I know it, except in the memory itself? Is it also present to itself
by its image, and not by itself?