The Varieties Of Religious Experience, By William James
Lecture III
The Reality Of The Unseen
WERE
one asked to characterize the life of religion in the
broadest and most general terms possible, one might say
that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen
order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously
adjusting ourselves thereto.
This belief and this adjustment are the religious
attitude in the soul. I wish during this hour to call your attention to some of the
psychological peculiarities of such an attitude as this,
or belief in an object which we cannot see.
All our attitudes, moral, practical, or emotional,
as well as religious, are due to the "objects"
of our consciousness, the things which we believe to exist,
whether really or ideally, along with ourselves. Such objects may be present to our senses, or they may be present
only to our thought.
In either case they elicit from us a REACTION;
and the reaction due to things of thought is notoriously
in many cases as strong as that due to sensible presences.
It may be even stronger.
The memory of an insult may make us angrier than
the insult did when we received it.
We are frequently more ashamed of our blunders
afterwards than we were at the moment of making them;
and in general our whole higher prudential and moral life
is based on the fact that material sensations actually
present may have a weaker influence on our action than
ideas of remoter facts.
The
more concrete objects of most men's religion, the deities
whom they worship, are known to them only in idea.
It has been vouchsafed, for example, to very few
Christian believers to have had a sensible vision of their
Saviour; though enough appearances of this sort are on
record, by way of miraculous exception, to merit our attention
later. The
whole force of the Christian religion, therefore, so far
as belief in the divine personages determines the prevalent
attitude of the believer, is in general exerted by the
instrumentality of pure ideas, of which nothing in the
individual's past experience directly serves as a model.
But
in addition to these ideas of the more concrete religious
objects, religion is full of abstract objects which prove
to have an equal power.
God's attributes as such, his holiness, his justice,
his mercy, his absoluteness, his infinity, his omniscience,
his tri-unity, the various mysteries of the redemptive
process, the operation of the sacraments, etc., have proved
fertile wells of inspiring meditation for Christian believers.[21]
We shall see later that the absence of definite sensible
images is positively insisted on by the mystical authorities
in all religions as the sine qua non of a successful orison,
or contemplation of the higher divine truths. Such contemplations
are expected (and abundantly verify the expectation, as
we shall also see) to influence the believer's subsequent
attitude very powerfully for good.
[21]
Example: "I
have had much comfort lately in meditating on the passages
which show the personality of the Holy Ghost, and his
distinctness from the Father and the Son.
It is a subject that requires searching into to
find out, but, when realized, gives one so much more true
and lively a sense of the fullness of the Godhead, and
its work in us and to us, than when only thinking of the
Spirit in its effect on us." Augustus Hare: Memorials,
i. 244, Maria Hare to Lucy H. Hare.
Immanuel
Kant held a curious doctrine about such objects of belief
as God, the design of creation, the soul, its freedom,
and the life hereafter.
These things, he said, are properly not objects
of knowledge at all.
Our conceptions always require a sense-content
to work with, and as the words soul,"
"God," "immortality," cover
no distinctive sense-content whatever, it follows that
theoretically speaking they are words devoid of any significance. Yet strangely enough they have a definite meaning FOR OUR PRACTICE.
We can act AS IF there were a God; feel AS IF we
were free; consider Nature AS IF she were full of special
designs; lay plans AS IF we were to be immortal; and we
find then that these words do make a genuine difference
in our moral life. Our faith THAT these unintelligible objects actually exist
proves thus to be a full equivalent in praktischer Hinsicht,
as Kant calls it, or from the point of view of our action,
for a knowledge of WHAT they might be, in case we were
permitted positively to conceive them.
So we have the strange phenomenon, as Kant assures
us, of a mind believing with all its strength in the real
presence of a set of things of no one of which it can
form any notion whatsoever.
My
object in thus recalling Kant's doctrine to your mind
is not to express any opinion as to the accuracy of this
particularly uncouth part of his philosophy, but only
to illustrate the characteristic of human nature which
we are considering, by an example so classical in its
exaggeration. The
sentiment of reality can indeed attach itself so strongly
to our object of belief that our whole life is polarized
through and through, so to speak, by its sense of the
existence of the thing believed in, and yet that thing,
for purpose of definite description, can hardly be said
to be present to our mind at all. It is as if a bar of iron, without touch or sight, with no
representative faculty whatever, might nevertheless be
strongly endowed with an inner capacity for magnetic feeling;
and as if, through the various arousals of its magnetism
by magnets coming and going in its neighborhood, it might
be consciously determined to different attitudes and tendencies.
Such a bar of iron could never give you an outward description
of the agencies that had the power of stirring it so strongly;
yet of their presence, and of their significance for its
life, it would be intensely aware through every fibre
of its being.
It
is not only the Ideas of pure Reason as Kant styled them,
that have this power of making us vitally feel presences
that we are impotent articulately to describe.
All sorts of higher abstractions bring with them
the same kind of impalpable appeal.
Remember those passages from Emerson which I read
at my last lecture.
The whole universe of concrete objects, as we know
them, swims, not only for such a transcendentalist writer,
but for all of us, in a wider and higher universe of abstract
ideas, that lend it its significance.
As time, space, and the ether soak through all
things so (we feel) do abstract and essential goodness,
beauty, strength, significance, justice, soak through
all things good, strong, significant, and just.
Such
ideas, and others equally abstract, form the background
for all our facts, the fountain-head of all the possibilities
we conceive of.
They give its "nature," as we call it,
to every special thing.
Everything we know is "what" it is by
sharing in the nature of one of these abstractions.
We can never look directly at them, for they are
bodiless and featureless and footless, but we grasp all
other things by their means, and in handling the real
world we should be stricken with helplessness in just
so far forth as we might lose these mental objects, these
adjectives and adverbs and predicates and heads of classification
and conception.
This
absolute determinability of our mind by abstractions is
one of the cardinal facts in our human constitution. Polarizing
and magnetizing us as they do, we turn towards them and
from them, we seek them, hold them, hate them, bless them,
just as if they were so many concrete beings. And beings
they are, beings as real in the realm which they inhabit
as the changing things of sense are in the realm of space.
Plato
gave so brilliant and impressive a defense of this common
human feeling, that the doctrine of the reality of abstract
objects has been known as the platonic theory of ideas
ever since. Abstract
Beauty, for example, is for Plato a perfectly definite
individual being, of which the intellect is aware as of
something additional to all the perishing beauties of
the earth. "The
true order of going," he says, in the often quoted
passage in his "Banquet," "is to use the
beauties of earth as steps along which one mounts upwards
for the sake of that other Beauty, going from one to two,
and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to
fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until
from fair notions, he arrives at the notion of absolute
Beauty, and at last knows what the essence of Beauty is."[22]
In our last lecture we had a glimpse of the way
in which a platonizing writer like Emerson may treat the
abstract divineness of things, the moral structure of
the universe, as a fact worthy of worship.
In those various churches without a God which to-day
are spreading through the world under the name of ethical
societies, we have a similar worship of the abstract divine,
the moral law believed in as an ultimate object.
"Science" in many minds is genuinely
taking the place of a religion.
Where this is so, the scientist treats the "Laws
of Nature" as objective facts to be revered.
A brilliant school of interpretation of Greek mythology
would have it that in their origin the Greek gods were
only half-metaphoric personifications of those great spheres
of abstract law and order into which the natural world
falls apart--the sky-sphere, the ocean-sphere, the earth-sphere,
and the like; just as even now we may speak of the smile
of the morning, the kiss of the breeze, or the bite of
the cold, without really meaning that these phenomena
of nature actually wear a human face.[23]
[22]
Symposium, Jowett, 1871, i.
527.
[23]
Example: "Nature
is always so interesting, under whatever aspect she shows
herself, that when it rains, I seem to see a beautiful
woman weeping. She
appears the more beautiful, the more afflicted she is."
B. de St. Pierre.
As
regards the origin of the Greek gods, we need not at present
seek an opinion.
But the whole array of our instances leads to a
conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of
reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception
of what we may call "something there," more
deep and more general than any of the special and particular
"senses" by which the current psychology supposes
existent realities to be originally revealed.
If this were so, we might suppose the senses to
waken our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually
do, by first exciting this sense of reality; but anything
else, any idea, for example, that might similarly excite
it, would have that same prerogative of appearing real
which objects of sense normally possess.
So far as religious conceptions were able to touch
this reality-feeling, they would be believed in in spite
of criticism, even though they might be so vague and remote
as to be almost unimaginable, even though they might be
such non-entities in point of WHATNESS, as Kant makes
the objects of his moral theology to be.
The
most curious proofs of the existence of such an undifferentiated
sense of reality as this are found in experiences of hallucination.
It often happens that an hallucination is imperfectly
developed: the
person affected will feel a "presence" in the
room, definitely localized, facing in one particular way,
real in the most emphatic sense of the word, often coming
suddenly, and as suddenly gone; and yet neither seen,
heard, touched, nor cognized in any of the usual "sensible"
ways. Let
me give you an example of this, before I pass to the objects
with whose presence religion is more peculiarly concerned.
An
intimate friend of mine, one of the keenest intellects
I know, has had several experiences of this sort.
He writes as follows in response to my inquiries:--<59>
"I
have several times within the past few years felt the
so- called 'consciousness of a presence.'
The experiences which I have in mind are clearly
distinguishable from another kind of experience which
I have had very frequently, and which I fancy many persons
would also call the 'consciousness of a presence.' But
the difference for me between the two sets of experience
is as great as the difference between feeling a slight
warmth originating I know not where, and standing in the
midst of a conflagration with all the ordinary senses
alert.
"It
was about September, 1884, when I had the first experience.
On the previous night I had had, after getting into bed
at my rooms in College, a vivid tactile hallucination
of being grasped by the arm, which made me get up and
search the room for an intruder; but the sense of presence
properly so called came on the next night.
After I had got into bed and blown out the candle,
I lay awake awhile thinking on the previous night's experience,
when suddenly I FELT something come into the room and
stay close to my bed.
It remained only a minute or two.
I did not recognize it by any ordinary sense and
yet there was a horribly unpleasant 'sensation' connected
with it. It
stirred something more at the roots of my being than any
ordinary perception. The feeling had something of the quality of a very large tearing
vital pain spreading chiefly over the chest, but within
the organism--and yet the feeling was not PAIN so much
as ABHORRENCE. At all events, something was present with me, and I knew its
presence far more surely than I have ever known the presence
of any fleshly living creature.
I was conscious of its departure as of its coming:
an almost instantaneously swift going through the
door, and the 'horrible sensation' disappeared.
"On
the third night when I retired my mind was absorbed in
some lectures which I was preparing, and I was still absorbed
in these when I became aware of the actual presence (though
not of the COMING) of the thing that was there the night
before, and of the 'horrible sensation.' I then mentally
concentrated all my effort to charge this 'thing,' if
it was evil to depart, if it was NOT evil, to tell me
who or what it was, and if it could not explain itself,
to go, and that I would compel it <60> to go.
It went as on the previous night, and my body quickly
recovered its normal state.
"On
two other occasions in my life I have had precisely the
same 'horrible sensation.'
Once it lasted a full quarter of an hour.
In all three instances the certainty that there
in outward space there stood SOMETHING was indescribably
STRONGER than the ordinary certainty of companionship
when we are in the close presence of ordinary living people. The something seemed close to me, and intensely more real than
any ordinary perception. Although I felt it to be like
unto myself so to speak, or finite, small, and distressful,
as it were, I didn't recognize it as any individual being
or person."
Of
course such an experience as this does not connect itself
with the religious sphere.
Yet it may upon occasion do so; and the same correspondent
informs me that at more than one other conjuncture he
had the sense of presence developed with equal intensity
and abruptness, only then it was filled with a quality
of joy.
"There
was not a mere consciousness of something there, but fused
in the central happiness of it, a startling awareness
of some ineffable good.
Not vague either, not like the emotional effect
of some poem, or scene, or blossom, of music, but the
sure knowledge of the close presence of a sort of mighty
person, and after it went, the memory persisted as the
one perception of reality.
Everything else might be a dream, but not that."
My
friend, as it oddly happens, does not interpret these
latter experiences theistically, as signifying the presence
of God. But it would clearly not have been unnatural to interpret them
as a revelation of the deity's existence.
When we reach the subject of mysticism, we shall
have much more to say upon this head.
Lest
the oddity of these phenomena should disconcert you, I
will venture to read you a couple of similar narratives,
much shorter, merely to show that we are dealing with
a well-marked natural kind of fact. In the first case, which I <61> take from the Journal
of the Society for Psychical Research, the sense of presence
developed in a few moments into a distinctly visualized
hallucination--but I leave that part of the story out.
"I
had read," the narrator says, "some twenty minutes
or so, was thoroughly absorbed in the book, my mind was
perfectly quiet, and for the time being my friends were
quite forgotten, when suddenly without a moment's warning
my whole being seemed roused to the highest state of tension
or aliveness, and I was aware, with an intenseness not
easily imagined by those who had never experienced it,
that another being or presence was not only in the room,
but quite close to me.
I put my book down, and although my excitement
was great, I felt quite collected, and not conscious of
any sense of fear.
Without changing my position, and looking straight
at the fire, I knew somehow that my friend A. H. was standing
at my left elbow but so far behind me as to be hidden
by the armchair in which I was leaning back.
Moving my eyes round slightly without otherwise
changing my position, the lower portion of one leg became
visible, and I instantly recognized the gray-blue material
of trousers he often wore, but the stuff appeared semitransparent,
reminding me of tobacco smoke in consistency,"[24]--
and hereupon the visual hallucination came.
[24]
Journal of the S. P. R., February, 1895, p. 26.
Another
informant writes:--
"Quite
early in the night I was awakened. . . . I felt as if
I had been aroused intentionally, and at first thought
some one was breaking into the house. . . . I then turned
on my side to go to sleep again, and immediately felt
a consciousness of a presence in the room, and singular
to state, it was not the consciousness of a live person,
but of a spiritual presence.
This may provoke a smile, but I can only tell you
the facts as they occurred to me.
I do not know how to better describe my sensations
than by simply stating that I felt a consciousness of
a spiritual presence. . . .
I felt also at the same time a strong feeling of
superstitious dread, as if something strange and fearful
were about to happen."[25]
[25]
E. Gurney: Phantasms
of the Living, i. 384.
Professor
Flournoy of Geneva gives me the following testimony of
a friend of his, a lady, who has the gift of automatic
or involuntary writing:--
"Whenever
I practice automatic writing, what makes me feel that
it is not due to a subconscious self is the feeling I
always have of a foreign presence, external to my body.
It is sometimes so definitely characterized that
I could point to its exact position.
This impression of presence is impossible to describe.
It varies in intensity and clearness according to the
personality from whom the writing professes to come.
If it is some one whom I love, I feel it immediately,
before any writing has come.
My heart seems to recognize it."
In
an earlier book of mine I have cited at full length a
curious case of presence felt by a blind man.
The presence was that of the figure of a gray-bearded
man dressed in a pepper and salt suit, squeezing himself
under the crack of the door and moving across the floor
of the room towards a sofa.
The blind subject of this quasi-hallucination is
an exceptionally intelligent reporter.
He is entirely without internal visual imagery
and cannot represent light or colors to himself, and is
positive that his other senses, hearing, etc., were not
involved in this false perception.
It seems to have been an abstract conception rather,
with the feelings of reality and spatial outwardness directly
attached to it--in other words, a fully objectified and
exteriorized IDEA.
Such
cases, taken along with others which would be too tedious
for quotation, seem sufficiently to prove the existence
in our mental machinery of a sense of present reality
more diffused and general than that which our special
senses yield. For
the psychologists the tracing of the organic seat of such
a feeling would form a pretty problem--nothing could be
more natural than to connect it with the muscular sense,
with the feeling that our muscles were innervating themselves
for action. Whatsoever
thus innervated our activity, or "made our flesh
creep"--our senses are what do so oftenest--might
then appear real and present, even though it were but
an abstract idea.
But with such vague conjectures we have no concern
at present, for our interest lies with the faculty rather
than with its organic seat.
Like
all positive affections of consciousness, the sense of
reality has its negative counterpart in the shape of a
feeling of unreality by which persons may be haunted,
and of which one sometimes hears complaint:--
"When
I reflect on the fact that I have made my appearance by
accident upon a globe itself whirled through space as
the sport of the catastrophes of the heavens," says
Madame Ackermann; "when I see myself surrounded by
beings as ephemeral and incomprehensible as I am myself,
and all excitedly pursuing pure chimeras, I experience
a strange feeling of being in a dream.
It seems to me as if I have loved and suffered
and that erelong I shall die, in a dream. My last word will be, 'I have been dreaming.'"[26]
[26]
Pensees d'un Solitaire, p. 66.
In
another lecture we shall see how in morbid melancholy
this sense of the unreality of things may become a carking
pain, and even lead to suicide.
We
may now lay it down as certain that in the distinctively
religious sphere of experience, many persons (how many
we cannot tell) possess the objects of their belief, not
in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect
accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-sensible
realities directly apprehended.
As his sense of the real presence of these objects
fluctuates, so the believer alternates between warmth
and coldness in his faith.
Other examples will bring this home to one better
than abstract description, so I proceed immediately to
cite some. The
first example is a negative one, deploring the loss of
the sense in question.
I have extracted it from an account given me by
a scientific man of my acquaintance, of his religious
life. It
seems to me to show clearly that the feeling of reality
may be something more like a sensation than an intellectual
operation properly so-called.
"Between
twenty and thirty I gradually became more and more agnostic
and irreligious, yet I cannot say that I ever lost that
'indefinite consciousness' which Herbert Spencer describes
so well, of an Absolute Reality behind phenomena.
For me this Reality was not the pure Unknowable
of Spencer's philosophy, for although I had ceased my
childish prayers to God, and never prayed to IT in a formal
manner, yet my more recent experience shows me to have
been in a relation to IT which practically was the same
thing as prayer.
Whenever I had any trouble, especially when I had
conflict with other people, either domestically or in
the way of business, or when I was depressed in spirits
or anxious about affairs, I now recognize that I used
to fall back for support upon this curious relation I
felt myself to be in to this fundamental cosmical IT.
It was on my side, or I was on Its side, however
you please to term it, in the particular trouble, and
it always strengthened me and seemed to give me endless
vitality to feel its underlying and supporting presence.
In fact, it was an unfailing fountain of living
justice, truth, and strength, to which I instinctively
turned at times of weakness, and it always brought me
out. I know
now that it was a personal relation I was in to it, because
of late years the power of communicating with it has left
me, and I am conscious of a perfectly definite loss. I used never to fail to find it when I turned to it.
Then came a set of years when sometimes I found
it, and then again I would be wholly unable to make connection
with it. I
remember many occasions on which at night in bed, I would
be unable to get to sleep on account of worry.
I turned this way and that in the darkness, and
groped mentally for the familiar sense of that higher
mind of my mind which had always seemed to be close at
hand as it were, closing the passage, and yielding support,
but there was no electric current. A blank was there instead of IT:
I couldn't find anything.
Now, at the age of nearly fifty, my power of getting
into connection with it has entirely left me; and I have
to confess that a great help has gone out of my life.
Life has become curiously dead and <65> indifferent;
and I can now see that my old experience was probably
exactly the same thing as the prayers of the orthodox,
only I did not call them by that name.
What I have spoken of as 'It' was practically not
Spencer's Unknowable, but just my own instinctive and
individual God, whom I relied upon for higher sympathy,
but whom somehow I have lost."
Nothing
is more common in the pages of religious biography than
the way in which seasons of lively and of difficult faith
are described as alternating.
Probably every religious person has the recollection
of particular crisis in which a directer vision of the
truth, a direct perception, perhaps, of a living God's
existence, swept in and overwhelmed the languor of the
more ordinary belief. In James Russell Lowell's correspondence there is a brief memorandum
of an experience of this kind:--
"I
had a revelation last Friday evening.
I was at Mary's, and happening to say something
of the presence of spirits (of whom, I said, I was often
dimly aware), Mr. Putnam entered into an argument with
me on spiritual matters.
As I was speaking, the whole system rose up before
me like a vague destiny looming from the Abyss.
I never before so clearly felt the Spirit of God
in me and around rue.
The whole room seemed to me full of God. The air seemed to waver to and fro with the presence of Something
I knew not what.
I spoke with the calmness and clearness of a prophet.
I cannot tell you what this revelation was.
I have not yet studied it enough.
But I shall perfect it one day, and then you shall
hear it and acknowledge its grandeur."[27]
[27]
Letters of Lowell, i. 75.
<66>
Here is a longer and more developed experience from a
manuscript communication by a clergyman--I take it from
Starbuck's manuscript collection:--
"I
remember the night, and almost the very spot on the hill-top,
where my soul opened out, as it were, into the Infinite,
and there was a rushing together of the two worlds, the
inner and the outer.
It was deep calling unto deep--the deep that my
own struggle had opened up within being answered by the
unfathomable deep without, reaching beyond the stars.
I stood alone with Him who had made me, and all
the beauty of the world, and love, and sorrow, and even
temptation. I
did not seek Him, but felt the perfect unison of my spirit
with His. The
ordinary sense of things around me faded. For the moment nothing but an ineffable joy and exultation
remained. It
is impossible fully to describe the experience.
It was like the effect of some great orchestra
when all the separate notes have melted into one swelling
harmony that leaves the listener conscious of nothing
save that his soul is being wafted upwards, and almost
bursting with its own emotion.
The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled
by a more solemn silence.
The darkness held a presence that was all the more
felt because it was not seen.
I could not any more have doubted that HE was there
than that I was.
Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the less
real of the two.
"My
highest faith in God and truest idea of him were then
born in me. I
have stood upon the Mount of Vision since, and felt the
Eternal round about me.
But never since has there come quite the same stirring
of the heart. Then,
if ever, I believe, I stood face to face with God, and
was born anew of his spirit. There was, as I recall it,
no sudden change of thought or of belief, except that
my early crude conception, had, as it were burst into
flower. There
was no destruction of the old, but a rapid, wonderful
unfolding. Since
that time no discussion that I have heard of the proofs
of God's existence has been able to shake my faith.
Having once felt the presence of God's spirit,
I have never lost it again for long.
My most assuring evidence of his existence is deeply
rooted in that hour of vision in the memory of that supreme
experience, and in the conviction, gained from reading
and reflection, that something the same has come to all
who have found God.
I am aware that it may justly be called mystical.
I am not enough acquainted with philosophy to defend
it from that or any other charge.
I feel that in writing of it I have overlaid it
with words rather than put it clearly to your thought.
But, such as it is, I have described it as carefully
as I now am able to do."
Here
is another document, even more definite in character,
which, the writer being a Swiss, I translate from the
French original.[28]
[28]
I borrow it, with Professor Flournoy's permission, from
his rich collection of psychological documents.
"I
was in perfect health:
we were on our sixth day of tramping, and in good
training. We
had come the day before from Sixt to Trient by Buet.
I felt neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and
my state of mind was equally healthy.
I had had at Forlaz good news from home; I was
subject to no anxiety, either near or remote, for we had
a good guide, and there was not a shadow of uncertainty
about the road we should follow.
I can best describe the condition in which I was
by calling it a state of equilibrium.
When all at once I experienced a feeling of being
raised above myself, I felt the presence of God--I tell
of the thing just as I was conscious of it--as if his
goodness and his power were penetrating me altogether.
The throb of emotion was so violent that I could
barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me.
I then sat down on a stone, unable to stand any
longer, and my eyes overflowed with tears.
I thanked God that in the course of my life he
had taught me to know him, that he sustained my life and
took pity both on the insignificant creature and on the
sinner that I was.
I begged him ardently that my life might be consecrated
to the doing of his will.
I felt his reply, which was that I should do his
will from day to day in humility and poverty, leaving
him, the Almighty God, to be judge of whether I should
some time be called to bear witness more conspicuously.
Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart; that is,
I felt that God had withdrawn the communion which he had
granted, and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so
strongly was I still possessed by the interior emotion.
Besides, I had wept uninterruptedly for several minutes,
my eyes were swollen, and I did not wish my companions
to see me. The
state of ecstasy may have lasted four or five minutes,
although it seemed at the time to last much longer.
My comrades waited for me ten minutes at the cross
of Barine, but I took about twenty-five or thirty minutes
to join them, for as well as I can remember, they said
that I had kept them back for about half an hour.
The impression had been so profound that in climbing
slowly the slope I asked myself if it were possible that
Moses on Sinai could have had a more intimate communication
with God. I
think it well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God
had neither form, color, odor, nor taste; moreover, that
the feeling of his presence was accompanied with no determinate
localization. It was rather as if my personality had been
transformed by the presence of a SPIRITUAL SPIRIT.
But the more I seek words to express this intimate
intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of describing
the thing by any of our usual images.
At bottom the expression most apt to render what
I felt is this:
God was present, though invisible; he fell under
no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him."
The
adjective "mystical" is technically applied,
most often. to states that are of brief duration.
Of course such hours of rapture as the last two
persons describe are mystical experiences, of which in
a later lecture I shall have much to say.
Meanwhile here is the abridged record of another
mystical or semi-mystical experience, in a mind evidently
framed by nature for ardent piety.
I owe it to Starbuck's collection.
The lady who gives the account is the daughter
of a man well known in his time as a writer against Christianity.
The suddenness of her conversion shows well how
native the sense of God's presence must be to certain
minds. She
relates that she was brought up in entire ignorance of
Christian doctrine, but, when in Germany, after being
talked to by Christian friends, she read the Bible and
prayed, and finally the plan of salvation flashed upon
her like a stream of light.
<69>
"To this day," she writes, "I cannot understand
dallying with religion and the commands of God.
The very instant I heard my Father's cry calling
unto me, my heart bounded in recognition.
I
ran, I stretched forth my arms, I cried aloud, 'Here,
here I am, my Father.' Oh, happy child, what should I
do? 'Love
me,' answered my God.
'I do, I do,' I cried passionately. 'Come unto
me,' called my Father. 'I will,' my heart panted.
Did I stop to ask a single question?
Not one.
It never occurred to me to ask whether I was good
enough, or to hesitate over my unfitness, or to find out
what I thought of his church, or . . . to wait until I
should be satisfied.
Satisfied! I was satisfied.
Had I not found my God and my Father?
Did he not love me?
Had he not called me?
Was there not a Church into which I might enter?
. . . Since then I have had direct answers to prayer--so
significant as to be almost like talking with God and
hearing his answer.
The idea of God's reality has never left me for
one moment."
Here
is still another case, the writer being a man aged twenty-seven,
in which the experience, probably almost as characteristic,
is less vividly described:--
"I
have on a number of occasions felt that I had enjoyed
a period of intimate communion with the divine.
These meetings came unasked and unexpected, and
seemed to consist merely in the temporary obliteration
of the conventionalities which usually surround and cover
my life. . . . Once
it was when from the summit of a high mountain I looked
over a gashed and corrugated landscape extending to a
long convex of ocean that ascended to the horizon, and
again from the same point when I could see nothing beneath
me but a boundless expanse of white cloud, on the blown
surface of which a few high peaks, including the one I
was on, seemed plunging about as if they were dragging
their anchors.
What
I felt on these occasions was a temporary loss of my own
identity, accompanied by an illumination which revealed
to me a deeper significance than I had been wont to attach
to life. It
is in this that I find my justification for saying that
I have enjoyed communication with God.
Of course the absence of such a being as this would
be chaos. I cannot conceive of life without its presence."
Of
the more habitual and so to speak chronic sense of God's
presence the following sample from Professor Starbuck's
manuscript collection may serve to give an idea.
It is from a man aged forty-nine--probably thousands
of unpretending Christians would write an almost identical
account.
"God
is more real to me than any thought or thing or person.
I feel his presence positively, and the more as
I live in closer harmony with his laws as written in my
body and mind. I
feel him in the sunshine or rain; and awe mingled with
a delicious restfulness most nearly describes my feelings.
I talk to him as to a companion in prayer and praise,
and our communion is delightful.
He answers me again and again, often in words so
clearly spoken that it seems my outer ear must have carried
the tone, but generally in strong mental impressions.
Usually a text of Scripture, unfolding some new
view of him and his love for me, and care for my safety.
I could give hundreds of instances, in school matters,
social problems, financial difficulties, etc.
That he is mine and I am his never leaves me, it
is an abiding joy.
Without it life would be a blank, a desert, a shoreless,
trackless waste."
I
subjoin some more examples from writers of different ages
and sexes. They
are also from Professor Starbuck's collection, and their
number might be greatly multiplied.
The first is from a man twenty-seven years old:--
"God
is quite real to me.
I talk to him and often get answers. Thoughts sudden
and distinct from any I have been entertaining come to
my mind after asking God for his direction.
Something over a year ago I was for some weeks
in the direst perplexity. When the trouble first appeared
before me I was dazed, but before long (two or three hours)
I could hear distinctly a passage of Scripture:
'My grace is sufficient for thee.'
Every time my thoughts turned to the trouble I
could hear this quotation. I don't think I ever doubted the existence of God, or had him
drop out of my consciousness.
God has frequently stepped into my affairs very
perceptibly, and I feel that he directs many little details
all the time. But
on two or three occasions he has ordered ways for me very
contrary to my ambitions and plans."
Another
statement (none the less valuable psychologically for
being so decidedly childish) is that of a boy of seventeen:--
"Sometimes
as I go to church, I sit down, join in the service, and
before I go out I feel as if God was with me, right side
of me, singing and reading the Psalms with me. . . . And
then again I feel as if I could sit beside him, and put
my arms around him, kiss him, etc.
When I am taking Holy Communion at the altar, I
try to get with him and generally feel his presence."
I
let a few other cases follow at random:--
"God
surrounds me like the physical atmosphere.
He is closer to me than my own breath.
In him literally I live and move and have my being."--
"There
are times when I seem to stand in his very presence, to
talk with him. Answers
to prayer have come, sometimes direct and overwhelming
in their revelation of his presence and powers.
There are times when God seems far off, but this
is always my own fault."--
"I
have the sense of a presence, strong, and at the same
time soothing, which hovers over me.
Sometimes it seems to enwrap me with sustaining
arms."
Such
is the human ontological imagination, and such is the
convincingness of what it brings to birth.
Unpicturable beings are realized, and realized
with an intensity almost like that of an hallucination.
They determine our vital attitude as decisively
as the vital attitude of lovers is determined by the habitual
sense, by which each is haunted, of the other being in
the world. A
lover has notoriously this sense of the continuous being
of his idol, even when his attention is addressed to other
matters and he no longer represents her features. He cannot forget her; she uninterruptedly affects him through
and through. I
spoke of the convincingness of these feelings of reality,
and I must dwell a moment longer on that point.
They are as convincing to those who have them as
any direct sensible experiences can be, and they are,
as a rule, much more convincing than results established
by mere logic ever are.
One may indeed be entirely without them; probably
more than one of you here present is without them in any
marked degree; but if you do have them, and have them
at all strongly, the probability is that you cannot help
regarding them as genuine perceptions of truth, as revelations
of a kind of reality which no adverse argument, however
unanswerable by you in words, can expel from your belief.
The
opinion opposed to mysticism in philosophy is sometimes
spoken of as RATIONALISM.
Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought
ultimately to find for themselves articulate grounds.
Such grounds, for rationalism, must consist of
four things: (1)
definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite
facts of sensation; (3) definite hypotheses based on such
facts; and (4) definite inferences logically drawn.
Vague impressions of something indefinable have
no place in the rationalistic system, which on its positive
side is surely a splendid intellectual tendency, for not
only are all our philosophies fruits of it, but physical
science (amongst other good things) is its result.
Nevertheless,
if we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on
the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning
and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow,
we have to confess that the part of it of which rationalism
can give an account is relatively superficial.
It is the part that has the prestige undoubtedly,
for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for proofs,
and chop logic, and put you down with words.
But it will fail to convince or convert you all
the same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed to its conclusions.
If you have intuitions at all, they come from a
deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level
which rationalism inhabits.
Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your
faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the
premises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight
of the result; and something in you absolutely KNOWS that
that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic
talk, however clever, that may contradict it.
This inferiority of the rationalistic level in
founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues
for religion as when it argues against it. That vast literature of proofs of God's existence drawn from
the order of nature, which a century ago seemed so overwhelmingly
convincing, to-day does little more than gather dust in
libraries, for the simple reason that our generation has
ceased to believe in the kind of God it argued for.
Whatever sort of a being God may be, we KNOW to-day
that he is nevermore that mere external inventor of "contrivances"
intended to make manifest his "glory" in which
our great-grandfathers took such satisfaction, though
just how we know this we cannot possibly make clear by
words either to others or to ourselves.
I defy any of you here fully to account for your
persuasion that if a God exist he must be a more cosmic
and tragic personage than that Being.
The
truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere,
articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate
feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor
of the same conclusion.
Then, indeed, our intuitions and our reason work
together, and great world-ruling systems, like that of
the Buddhist or of the Catholic philosophy, may grow up.
Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original
body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy
is but its showy translation into formulas.
The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep
thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition.
Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the presence of a living God after the fashion
shown by my quotations, your critical arguments, be they
never so superior, will vainly set themselves to change
his faith.
Please
observe, however, that I do not yet say that it is BETTER
that the subconscious and non-rational should thus hold
primacy in the religious realm.
I confine myself to simply pointing out that they
do so hold it as a matter of fact.
So
much for our sense of the reality of the religious objects.
Let me now say a brief word more about the attitudes they
characteristically awaken.
We
have already agreed that they are SOLEMN; and we have
seen reason to think that the most distinctive of them
is the sort of joy which may result in extreme cases from
absolute self-surrender.
The sense of the kind of object to which the surrender
is made has much to do with determining the precise complexion
of the joy; and the whole phenomenon is more complex than
any simple formula allows.
In the literature of the subject, sadness and gladness
have each been emphasized in turn.
The ancient saying that the first maker of the
Gods was fear receives voluminous corroboration from every
age of religious history; but none the less does religious
history show the part which joy has evermore tended to
play. Sometimes the joy has been primary; sometimes secondary, being
the gladness of deliverance from the fear. This latter
state of things, being the more complex, is also the more
complete; and as we proceed, I think we shall have abundant
reason for refusing to leave out either the sadness or
the gladness, if we look at religion with the breadth
of view which it demands.
Stated in the completest possible terms, a man's
religion involves both moods of contraction and moods
of expansion of his being.
But the quantitative mixture and order of these
moods vary so much from one age of the world, from one
system of thought, and from one individual to another,
that you may insist either on the dread and the submission,
or on the peace and the freedom as the essence of the
matter, and still remain materially within the limits
of the truth. The
constitutionally sombre and the constitutionally sanguine
onlooker are bound to emphasize opposite aspects of what
lies before their eyes.
The
constitutionally sombre religious person makes even of
his religious peace a very sober thing.
Danger still hovers in the air about it.
Flexion and contraction are not wholly checked.
It were sparrowlike and childish after our deliverance
to explode into twittering laughter and caper-cutting,
and utterly to forget the imminent hawk on bough.
Lie low, rather, lie low; for you are in the hands
of a living God.
In the Book of Job, for example, the impotence
of man and the omnipotence of God is the exclusive burden
of its author's mind.
"It is as high as heaven; what canst thou
do?--deeper than hell; what canst thou know?"
There is an astringent relish about the truth of
this conviction which some men can feel, and which for
them is as near an approach as can be made to the feeling
of religious joy.
"In
Job," says that coldly truthful writer, the author
of Mark Rutherford, "God reminds us that man is not
the measure of his creation.
The world is immense, constructed on no plan or
theory which the intellect of man can grasp. It is TRANSCENDENT
everywhere. This
is the burden of every verse, and is the secret if there
be one, of the poem.
Sufficient or insufficient, there is nothing more.
. . . God
is great, we know not his ways.
He takes from us all we have, but yet if we possess
our souls in patience, we MAY pass the valley of the shadow,
and come out in sunlight again.
We may or we may not! . . . What more have we to
say now than God said from the whirlwind over two thousand
five hundred years ago?"[29]
[29]
Mark Rutherford's Deliverance, London, 1885, pp. 196,
198.
If
we turn to the sanguine onlooker, on the other hand, we
find that deliverance is felt as incomplete unless the
burden be altogether overcome and the danger forgotten.
Such onlookers give us definitions that seem to
the sombre minds of whom we have just been speaking to
leave out all the solemnity that makes religious peace
so different from merely animal joys.
In the opinion of some writers an attitude might
be called religious, though no touch were left in it of
sacrifice or submission, no tendency to flexion, no bowing
of the head. Any
"habitual and regulated admiration," says Professor
J. R. Seeley,[30] "is worthy to be called a religion";
and accordingly he thinks that our Music, our Science,
and our so-called "Civilization," as these things
are now organized and admiringly believed in, form the
more genuine religions of our time.
Certainly the unhesitating and unreasoning way
in which we feel that we must inflict our civilization
upon "lower" races, by means of Hotchkiss guns,
etc., reminds one of nothing so much as of the early spirit
of Islam spreading its religion by the sword.
[30]
In his book (too little read, I fear), Natural Religion,
3d edition, Boston, 1886, pp. 91, 122.
In
my last lecture I quoted to you the ultra-radical opinion
of Mr. Havelock Ellis, that laughter of any sort may be
considered a religious exercise, for it bears witness
to the soul's emancipation.
I quoted this opinion in order to deny its adequacy. But we must now settle our scores more carefully with this
whole optimistic way of thinking.
It is far too complex to be decided off-hand.
I propose accordingly that we make of religious
optimism the theme of the next two lectures.